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CRIMINAL LAW 
SMALL CELLS, BIG PROBLEMS: THE 
INCREASING PRECISION OF CELL SITE 
LOCATION INFORMATION AND THE NEED 
FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTIONS 
ROBERT M. BLOOM* & 
WILLIAM T. CLARK** 
The past fifty years has witnessed an evolution in technology 
advancement in police surveillance.  Today, one of the essential tools of 
police surveillance is something most Americans carry with them in their 
pockets every day, the cell phone.  Cell phones not only contain a huge 
repository of personal data, they also provide continuous surveillance of a 
person’s movement known as cell site location information (CSLI). 
In 1986, Congress sought to provide some privacy protections to CSLI 
in the Stored Communication Act.1  Although this solution may have struck 
the proper balance in an age when cell phones were a mere novelty in the 
hands of a comparative few, we now live in an age where, as the U.S. 
Supreme Court recently recognized, cell phones could be seen “an important 
feature of human anatomy.”2 In 1986, there were only an estimated 681,825 
subscribers serviced by 1531, cell sites.  By 2013, there were 335 million 
subscribers and over 340,000 cell sites. 
 
*  Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. I wish to thank Dana Borelli of the 
class of 2017 of Boston College Law School and Mark Schreiber of McDermott, Will, and 
Emory LLP for their valuable assistance. 
**  J.D. Boston College Law School (2015). William will be clerking for Douglas 
Woodlock Senior Judge U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. 
1  18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711. 
2  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014). 
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Recently, cell phone service providers have begun to use small cell 
technologies, miniature cell phone towers that can provide additional 
coverage and bandwidth support to overburdened cellular networks.  Small 
cells, known variously as femtocells, picocells, and microcells, are already 
installed throughout the United States, in particular in urban areas.  As small 
cells overtake traditional cell phone towers as the most common means of 
transmitting cellular signals, CSLI will transform from a means of placing a 
person’s phone in a general area within a matter of miles to a precise 
location tracking tool charting a person’s movements down to a matter of 
feet. 
The late Justice Scalia in his 2001 majority opinion in Kyllo v. U.S.,3 a 
case involving thermal imaging, opined that “while the technology used in 
the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of 
more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”4 
This Article explores the evolution of CSLI by focusing on the rise of 
small cell technologies.  It also canvasses decisions in the circuits involving 
CSLI.  It points out that the third-party exception to the Fourth Amendment is 
inapplicable to CSLI.  Following Justice Scalia’s admonition, we believe that 
CSLI will only grow more precise as small cells infiltrate cellular networks 
and we therefore adopt an approach that incorporates the Fourth 
Amendment requirements for a search warrant particularly describing the 
place to be searched and items to be seized as well as the requirement for 
probable cause.  Placing CSLI under the Fourth Amendment would make a 
major section of the Stored Communication Act unconstitutional. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Dissenting from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Florida v. 
Riley,5 Justice Brennan bemoaned the Court’s choice to allow the government 
to observe a person’s home via helicopter without a warrant.6  Justice 
Brennan found it cause for concern that a four justice plurality of the Court 
was willing to “remove virtually all constitutional barriers to police 
surveillance” using this advanced technology.7  To close his dissent, Justice 
Brennan invoked one of the most powerful stories of police surveillance in 
western culture: George Orwell’s 1984.8  Noting the eerie parallel between 
the police surveillance methods at issue before the Court in Riley and 
Orwell’s vision of government helicopters darting across the sky, Justice 
Brennan quoted the description of the infamous figure that loomed over 
Orwell’s dystopian world: “The black-mustachio’d face gazed down from 
every commanding corner . . . . BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption 
said . . . .”9 
From a rudimentary tape recording device10 to a sophisticated cell 
phone-computer,11 the U.S. Supreme Court has struggled to balance the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections against the steady technological 
 
5  488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
6  See id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
7  Id. 
8  Id.  
9  Id. (quoting GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949)). 
10  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
11  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014). 
1. BLOOM 3/1/2017  5:54 PM 
170 BLOOM & CLARK [Vol. 106 
advancements in police surveillance.  The Court has confronted a wide range 
of surveillance technologies, from helicopters and heat rays to beepers and 
GPS trackers.12 Today, however, the greatest threat to privacy is not the latest 
sophisticated government technology.  It is a small rectangular box that 
resides in the pocket of nearly all Americans. 
As the Court observed, cell phones, given their huge storage capacity, 
contain the sum of an individual’s private life including photos, bank 
statements, videos, contacts, a literal trove of personal data, which the Court 
has sought to protect by requiring police to obtain a warrant before searching 
a cell phone.13  But besides the intimate details contained therein, cell phones 
also invisibly chart the path of a person’s movements throughout his or her 
day by generating what it is known as cell site location information (CSLI).14 
Courts and scholars are split over whether police should obtain a warrant 
before reviewing CSLI.15  Some view CSLI as blips of data generated and 
owned by private companies in the course of their business operations.16 
Under this view, police can review CSLI just as they could any other business 
record under the third-party doctrine exception.17  Others view CSLI, when 
taken all together, as a rich tapestry that reveals deeply personal details of an 
individual’s life.18  Under this view, police can only review CSLI after 
obtaining a warrant because people have a fundamental privacy right against 
having their every movement tracked by the government despite 
technological evolutions. 
Because of recent evolutions in cellular network technology, CSLI will 
soon paint an even more precise picture of a person’s location history.19  
 
12  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. at 447–48. 
13  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95. 
14  See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text (explaining how cell phones work and 
how CSLI is created).  
15  Compare Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A 
Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 690 (2011) (arguing that CSLI should 
receive Fourth Amendment protection), with Kyle Malone, Comment, The Fourth 
Amendment and the Stored Communications Act: Why the Warrantless Gathering of 
Historical Cell Site Location Information Poses No Threat to Privacy, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 701, 
706 (2012) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment does not require the government to obtain a 
warrant before reviewing historical CSLI). 
16  See, e.g., United States v. Davis (Davis II), 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015).  
17  See id. 
18  See, e.g., United States v. Graham (Graham I), 796 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2015), 
reh’g en banc granted, 624 F. App’x 75 (4th Cir. 2015). 
19  See infra notes 49–70 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of small cell 
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Cellular service providers, which have traditionally relied on large cell phone 
towers to send out signals, have started to add miniature cell phone towers 
known as “small cells” to their networks.20  Small cells allow service 
providers to dramatically increase the number of cell towers in a particular 
area.21  Although this provides many benefits to cell phone users, the 
increased concentration of cell towers means that CSLI will reveal a user’s 
location down to a matter of feet instead of a matter of miles.22 
This Article argues that the rise of small cells in cellular networks will 
make CSLI so accurate that it must fall under the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection.23  Part I discusses how cell phones operate relative to the 
collection of CSLI, the Fourth Amendment doctrines relevant to the 
collection of CSLI, and the current statutory framework by which the 
government obtains CSLI.24  Part II reviews the current split amongst courts 
regarding whether the Fourth Amendment is applicable to CSLI.25  Part III 
argues that the Fourth Amendment requires the government to obtain a 
particularized warrant supported by probable cause before reviewing CSLI.26  
Part III explains that the third-party doctrine, which has traditionally been 
regarded as an exception to the Fourth Amendment, does not apply to CSLI 
because people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the detailed 
location history cell phones generate, unlike the information traditionally 
covered under the doctrine.27 
I. A LOCATION TRACKER ON EVERY LAMPPOST: CSLI, SMALL CELLS, AND 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
This Part provides an introduction to CSLI and the Fourth 
Amendment.28  Section A explains how cell phones work and how cell 
phone service providers increasingly employ small cell technologies to 
operate their networks.29  Section B provides an overview of the Fourth 
Amendment principles relevant to CSLI, including the U.S. Supreme 
 
technologies). 
20  Graham I, 796 F.3d at 350–51.  
21  See infra notes 49–70 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of small cell 
technologies). 
22  Id. 
23  See infra notes 231–278 and accompanying text. 
24  See infra notes 28–139 and accompanying text. 
25  See infra notes 140–230 and accompanying text. 
26  See infra notes 231–278 and accompanying text. 
27  See infra notes 252–268 and accompanying text. 
28  See infra notes 32–139 and accompanying text. 
29  See infra notes 32–70 and accompanying text. 
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Court’s case law on location-based technologies and the third-party 
doctrine.30  Section C provides an overview of the statutory limitations on 
the government’s power to obtain CSLI.31 
A. CSLI AND THE RISE OF SMALL CELL TECHNOLOGIES 
1. Cell Phones and Traditional Cellular Networks 
In December 1947, while working as an engineer in Bell Labs, 
Douglas H. Ring wrote an internal memorandum with the subject: “Mobile 
Telephony – Wide Area Coverage.”32  In his memorandum, Ring 
envisioned “[a] highly developed mobile telephone system” that would 
“ultimately be capable of providing service to a mobile unit from any part 
of the country at any place in the country.”33  His system would operate by 
precisely arranging radio transmitters in a hexagon honey-comb pattern, 
with three transmitters placed at the corners of each hexagon.34  This would 
allow for the repeated use of certain frequencies with limited interference.35  
 Although it would take years for technology to catch up with his 
vision, Ring’s proposal provided a significant foundation for our modern 
cellular networks.36 
Modern cellular networks use base stations, also known as cell towers 
or cell sites, arranged in Ring’s hexagon pattern to provide radio coverage 
to the largest amount of space in the most efficient manner.37  Base stations 
are usually equipped with three antennas that each cover 120 degrees of 
area, thereby ensuring that each base station sends out signal in a complete 
circle.38 
A cell phone connects to a base station whenever it places or receives a 
 
30  See infra notes 71–124 and accompanying text. 
31  See infra notes 125–139 and accompanying text. 
32  Alexis C. Madrigal, The 1947 Paper That First Described a Cell-Phone Network, 
THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/09/the-
1947-paper-that-first-described-a-cell-phone-network/245222/. 
33  Id. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  See id.; see also JON AGAR, CONSTANT TOUCH: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF THE MOBILE 
PHONE, 19–22 (2d ed. 2004), https://www.ucl.ac.uk/sts/staff/agar/documents/agar_constant
touch. 
37  Thomas A. O’Malley, Using Historical Cell Site Analysis Evidence in Criminal 
Trials, U.S. ATT’Y BULL 16, 19 (2011), http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_
room/usab5906.pdf. 
38  Id. at 27. 
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call or text message.39  When a cell phone connects to the base station, it 
provides the user’s telephone number as well as other information, 
including the device’s International Mobile Equipment Identifier,40 a unique 
number that identifies the particular cell phone (like a VIN number for 
cars).  The wireless service provider, which maintains the cellular network, 
records which cell phone connected to the network, when it connected, and 
through which base station it connected in order to bill the account 
associated with that device.41  This information is known generally as 
CSLI.42 
The rapid rise of smartphones and other mobile computing devices has 
threatened to overload the traditional cellular network.43  In 2012, 
Americans used 1.468 trillion megabytes of data annually.44  In 2014, that 
number more than doubled, as Americans used 4.06 trillion megabytes of 
data annually.45 Moreover, each year more and more people are turning 
away from laptop and desktop computers to rely almost exclusively on their 
mobile devices.46  Some predict that by 2017, mobile devices will be the 
 
39  Graham I, 796 F.3d 332, 343 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, 624 F. App’x 75 
(4th Cir. 2015). 
40  O’Malley, supra note 37, at 20. 
41  Id. at 23.  
42  CSLI comes in two discrete forms: real-time and historic. This Article focuses on 
historic CSLI, as it is the Fourth Amendment’s application to this information that has 
divided courts. See Malone, supra note 15, at 710 (discussing the difference between historic 
and real-time CSLI and observing that “[a] majority of courts” have required warrants based 
on probable cause for orders for real-time CSLI). 
43  See CTIA-The Wireless Association Survey Shows Americans Used 26 Percent More 
Wireless Data in 2014, CTIA (Jun. 17, 2015), http://www.ctia.org/resource-library/press-
releases/archive/ctia-survey-shows-americans-used-26-percent-more-wireless-data-in-2014 
(stating that “[t]he year-over-year pressure of skyrocketing mobile data and device growth 
highlights the need for a long-term national spectrum plan so that Americans continue to 
enjoy new and innovative wireless offerings”).  
44  See Mike Dano, CTIA: U.S. wireless network traffic reaches 1.468 trillion MB in 
2012, FIERCE WIRELESS (May 2, 2013) http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/ctia-us-wireless-
network-traffic-reaches-1468-trillion-mb-2012/2013-05-02 (stating that “CTIA today 
released its semi-annual survey, showing that wireless network data traffic in the United 
States rose 69.3 percent in 2012 from 2011. The firm said the total amount of megabytes 
traveling over U.S. wireless networks in 2012 reached 1.468 trillion, up from 866.8 billion in 
2011.”).  
45  CTIA, supra note 43. 
46
 SMALL CELL FORUM, SMALL CELLS–WHAT’S THE BIG IDEA? 1 (2014), http://scf.io/en/
documents/030_-_Small_cells_big_ideas.php (hereinafter “WHAT’S THE BIG IDEA?”); Aaron 
Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 1, 2015) http://www.
pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/. 
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primary generators of all Internet traffic,47 thus the need for more CSLI 
locations and technology which is discussed in the next Section.  In order to 
address these growing capacity challenges, many service providers are 
turning to small cell technologies.48 
2. Small Cell Technology and the Growing Precision of CSLI 
Small cells are miniature base stations that provide a small range of 
cellular signal in areas that are either overburdened or underserved by 
traditional cellular networks.49  Small cells typically have a range of nine 
meters (about thirty feet) to several hundred meters as compared to 
traditional cell towers, which cover several “tens of kilometers.”50  Small 
cells can serve urban communities, where the high population density puts a 
massive strain on the network, or rural communities where installing a large 
base station would not be cost-effective.51  Small cells have many different 
names based on their different functions and uses, including femtocells, 
picocells, microcells, and metrocells.52 
Femtocells are compact base stations, some about the size of a 
broadband router, developed for residential use.53  For those who have poor 
cell phone coverage at home, femtocells put a cell phone tower into the 
home itself.54  Several major wireless networks, including Verizon and 
AT&T, sell femtocells directly to consumers for use in their homes for 
approximately two hundred fifty dollars.55 
Picocells are another form of small cell technology developed for 
commercial or public use.56  For example, picocells can be installed in high-
 
47  WHAT’S THE BIG IDEA?, supra note 46, at 1. 
48  Id. at 1–2.  
49  Id. at 3. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. 
52  WHAT’S THE BIG IDEA?, supra note 46, at 1.  
53  Jeffrey G. Andrews et al., Femtocells: Past, Present, and Future, 30 (3) IEEE J. ON 
SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, 497 (Apr. 2012); WHAT’S THE BIG IDEA?, supra note 
46, at 3. 
54  WHAT’S THE BIG IDEA?, supra note 46, at 3. 
55  See, e.g., VERIZON, SAMSUNG NETWORK EXTENDER (SCS-2U01), http://www.verizon
wireless.com/accessories/samsung-network-extender-scs-2u01/ (last visited Jul. 23, 2016) 
(marketing its network extender as “a miniature cell phone tower” and listing its price at 
$249.99); AT&T, AT&T MICROCELL, http://www.att.com/att/microcell/ (last visited Jul. 23, 
2016) (advertising its femtocell as “a mini cellular tower, boosting cellular performance in 
your home or small business”).  
56  WHAT’S THE BIG IDEA?, supra note 46, at 3; FUJITSU, HIGH-CAPACITY INDOOR 
WIRELESS SOLUTIONS: PICOCELL OR FEMTOCELL?  2 (2013) https://www.fujitsu.com/us/
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network demand locations, such as hotels, large office buildings, or even 
sports arenas, in order to offload some of the demand placed on the 
traditional network.57  Microcells are a similar technology more appropriate 
for outdoor use.58 
Finally, small cell technologies used in dense urban areas are 
sometimes referred to as metrocells.59  Metrocells can address signal issues 
in so-called “urban canyons”—narrow streets where tall buildings may 
obstruct signal.60  Metrocells are often hidden in plain sight on city streets, 
attached to streetlights, building walls, or even security camera poles.61 
Given the wide variety of small cells and the different advantages they 
provide, service providers have increasingly incorporated them into their 
networks.  In 2011, it was estimated that there were 2.3 million femtocells 
in use globally.62  For 2015, industry analysts expected 4 million small cells 
to ship and projected that number to reach 8 million per year by 2019.63  
Verizon and AT&T are projected to add approximately 100,000 small cells 
in the United States in 2016.64  According to one report, by 2020, 40% of 
small cells will be deployed in hyper-dense networks, where there will be 
more than 150 small cells concentrated in one square kilometer.65 
Service providers have begun to partner with municipalities to install 
small cells.  Verizon recently announced that it would place 400 small cells 
 
Images/High-Capacity-Indoor-Wireless.pdf.  
57  WHAT’S THE BIG IDEA?, supra note 46, at 3; Jeffrey Spivak, Raising the (Phone 
Coverage) Bars in Commercial Buildings, URBAN LAND (May 12, 2014), http://urbanland.
uli.org/infrastructure-transit/raising-phone-coverage-bars-commercial-buildings/ (describing 
how owners of commercial real estate are integrating picocells and other small cell 
technologies into their buildings). 
58  WHAT’S THE BIG IDEA?, supra note 46, at 3. 
59  Id. 
60  Id.; FUJISTSU, supra note 56, at 2.  
61  WHAT’S THE BIG IDEA?, supra note 46, at 3; Chuck Soder, ‘Small Cells’ are One of 
the Next Big Things for Carriers, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUSINESS  (Apr. 13, 2015), 
http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20150412/SUB1/304129979/small-cells-are-one-of-
the-next-big-things-for-carriers (discussing Verizon’s placement of small cells on street 
lights and utility poles in Cleveland). 
62  Andrews et al., supra note 53, at 497. 
63  SMALL CELL FORUM, SMALL CELLS DEPLOYMENT MARKET STATUS REPORT (2015), 
http://scf.io/en/documents/050_-_Market_status_report_June_2015_-_Mobile_Experts.php. 
64  Martha DeGrasse, Can Verizon and AT&T Deploy 100,000 New Small Cells?, RCR 
WIRELESS NEWS (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.rcrwireless.com/20151029/carriers/can-
verizon-and-att-deploy-100000-new-small-cells-tag4. 
65  SMALL CELL FORUM, CROSSING THE CHASM: SMALL CELLS INDUSTRY (2015), 
http://scf.io/en/white_papers/Crossing_the_Chasm_Small_Cells_Industry_2015.php. 
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on utility poles throughout San Francisco.66  Similarly, Los Angeles has 
announced a partnership with Ericsson, a European telecommunications 
company, to install 100 “SmartPoles,” streetlights that will incorporate 
small cell technology.67  The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
has also recently updated its rules on cellular networks to promote the 
installation of small cells.68  The FCC reformed its environmental and 
historic preservation rules in order to ensure that small cell technologies 
would be able “to flourish, delivering more broadband service to more 
communities.”69 
The integration of small cell technologies into cellular networks will 
make CSLI increasingly precise.  Because CSLI generated from small cells 
could reveal a cell phone user’s location to within fewer than ten feet, such 
CSLI would be more accurate than location data generated from GPS 
technologies, which can determine location to within only fifty feet.70  
Recognizing the growing threat to privacy that CSLI presents, courts have 
struggled with how to best apply both constitutional and statutory 
protections to this information. 
B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND LOCATION TRACKING 
The Fourth Amendment provides two essential protections.  First, it 
enshrines “[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”71  Second, it limits the power of courts to grant 
 
66  Martha DeGrasse, Verizon Explains Rollout of Small Cells, RCR WIRELESS NEWS 
(July 29, 2015), http://www.rcrwireless.com/20150729/network-infrastructure/verizon-
explains-small-cell-rollout-tag4. One resident protested Verizon’s proposed location for a 
new small cell, expressing concern that “the antenna is on the pole ten feet in front of my 
house.” CBS SF BAY AREA, SF Residents Battle Wireless Firms Over Super Bowel Building 
Boom, (Oct. 31, 2015), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2015/10/31/san-francisco-residents-
battle-wireless-companies-cell-tower-building-boom-super-bowl-fifty/. 
67  Aaron Tilley, Los Angeles Becomes First City to Test the Future of Wireless 
Connectivity with ‘Small Cells’ on Streetlights (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
aarontilley/2015/11/05/los-angeles-becomes-first-city-to-test-the-future-of-wireless-
connectivity-with-small-cells-on-streetlights/#52196ae653ad. 
68  In the Matter of Acceleration of Broadband Deployment by Improving Wireless 
Facilities Siting Policies, 29 F.C.C. Rcd. 12865, No. 16 (2014). 
69  Id. at 12876. 
70  United States v. Carpenter, Nos. 14-1572, 14-1805, 2016 WL 1445183, at *9 (6th Cir. 
Apr. 13, 2016) (describing the accuracy of GPS data); Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher 
Soghoain, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable Standards For Law Enforcement 
Access To Location Data That Congress Could Enact, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 132 
(2012). 
71  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
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warrants, allowing warrants to issue only when the government establishes 
“probable cause . . . and particularly describ[es] the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.”72  The particularity requirement was 
designed by the Founding Fathers to combat the use of general warrants by 
English Customs Officers which allowed them to search anywhere they 
wanted for uncustomed goods.73 
There are two different theories for determining whether a “search” 
has occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment: the trespass 
theory and the privacy theory.74  Under the trespass theory, the government 
searches only when it physically intrudes upon certain recognized property 
interests.75  For many years, the trespass theory was the only way to 
establish a search under the Fourth Amendment.76 
In the 1967 landmark decision of Katz v. United States,77 the U.S.  
Supreme Court introduced a new vision of the Fourth Amendment based 
not in property rights, but in privacy rights.78  In Katz, the defendant entered 
a telephone booth and called someone to place a bet.79  The government, 
having installed a listening device on the telephone booth, recorded his 
conversation, and Katz was later convicted of illegal gambling.80  The Court 
held that recording the defendant’s conversation violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights.81  Although the Court noted that the government had 
not trespassed against the defendant’s property, it found that the Fourth 
Amendment protects whatever information a person “seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public.”82  The Court was willing 
to recognize the defendant’s asserted privacy right because people 
 
72  Id. 
73  See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004).  
74  United States v. Davis (Davis I), 754 F.3d 1205, 1212–13 (11th Cir. 2014), reh’g en 
banc granted, opinion vacated, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014) and on reh’g en banc in 
part, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015) (discussing the two 
theories of Fourth Amendment searches and their history). 
75  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct 945, 949–50 (2012). 
76  See id. (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001)); Orin Kerr, The Fourth 
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 801, 816 (2004) (“[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to 
common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century.”). 
77  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
78  Id. at 353; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928), overruled by 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
79  Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
80  Id. 
81  Id. at 347. 
82  Id. at 347, 352–53. 
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reasonably expect that, when they enter a telephone booth, their phone call 
“will not be broadcast to the world.”83  The Court sought to extend the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections to phone calls in telephone booths in part 
because of “the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in 
private communication.”84 
Concurring in Katz, Justice Harlan proposed a two-step privacy-based 
test for assessing Fourth Amendment claims, which has become the modern 
standard for claims brought under the privacy theory.85  First, the Court 
examines whether a person has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation 
of privacy” in the place or information at issue.86  Second, the Court decides 
whether that expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”87  If both conditions are met, then a Fourth 
Amendment search has occurred and, barring an exception to the contrary, a 
warrantless search of such information will be deemed improper.88  In 
addition, probable cause would also be required. 
The Court has struggled to determine when and where society will 
recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy, particularly in the face of 
technological evolutions.  In a pair of 1980s cases, the Court grappled with 
beeper technology, an early location-tracking tool.89  In 1983, the Court 
held in United States v. Knotts that the police did not violate the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights by using a beeper to track his journey along 
public roads from the scene of a drug purchase to an associate’s house.90  
The Court observed that the same tracking could have been accomplished 
through visual surveillance alone.91  The Court recognized the defendant’s 
argument that such a narrow view of the Fourth Amendment would allow 
“twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country . . . without 
judicial knowledge or supervision.”92  But the Court found that the 
surveillance at issue in this case was quite limited in duration (from one 
location to another) and stated that “if such dragnet-type law enforcement 
 
83  Id. at 352. 
84  Id.  
85  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 
(2012) (noting how “later cases have applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence”). 
86  Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
87  Id. 
88  Id. 
89  United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 
276, 277 (1983). 
90  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82.  
91  Id. at 282. 
92  Id. at 283. 
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practices . . . should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to 
determine whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”93 
In 1984, the Court in United States v. Karo placed a key limitation on 
the use of location-tracking technology.  In Karo, just as in Knotts, the 
government used a concealed beeper to track the movements of the 
defendant.94  Unlike in Knotts, the government continued to monitor the 
beeper after it had been placed in the defendant’s house.95  The Court found 
that this in-home tracking went beyond what the government could have 
visually observed from public streets, for the beeper told the government 
“that a particular article is actually located at a particular time in the private 
residence and is in the possession of the person or persons whose residence 
is being watched.”96  To the Court, this information “reveal[ed] a critical 
fact about the interior of the premises that the Government . . . could not 
have otherwise obtained without a warrant.”97  Therefore, the Court held the 
use of the beeper violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his whereabouts while out of public sight in his home.98  It should be 
pointed out that the home enjoys the greatest Fourth Amendment 
protection.99 
Nearly thirty years later, the Court fractured over how to bring the next 
generation of location-tracking technology into the Fourth Amendment’s 
purview.  In 2012, the Court in United States v. Jones100 unanimously found 
that when the government tracked the defendant using a GPS device it 
installed on his vehicle, it had “searched” the defendant within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.101  The majority explicitly declined to determine 
whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the GPS 
location information.102  Instead, the majority returned to the pre-Katz 
trespass doctrine and emphasized the fact that the government had 
physically attached the GPS device to the vehicle, holding that when “the 
Government obtains information by physically intruding on a 
 
93  Id. at 284. 
94  Karo, 468 U.S. at 707–08. 
95  Id. at 714. 
96  Karo, 468 U.S. at 715. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. at 716. 
99  See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) 
100  132 S. Ct 945 (2012). 
101  Id. at 949, 957–58 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
102  Id. at 947 (majority opinion) (noting how the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights 
do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation). 
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constitutionally protected area . . . a search has undoubtedly occurred.”103 
Justice Alito took issue with the majority’s reliance on the archaic 
trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment in a concurrence joined by 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan.104  Justice Alito asserted that Katz 
“did away with” the trespass theory of the Fourth Amendment, leaving the 
privacy approach as the exclusive framework.105  Justice Alito, however, 
struggled to explain what amount of location tracking triggered the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection by violating a defendant’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy.  Justice Alito noted the continued applicability of Knotts, stating 
that “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements on public 
streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized 
as reasonable.”106  But, he found that the “longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”107  
Acknowledging the doctrinal tension of applying the Fourth Amendment in 
this context, Justice Alito invited Congress to enact new regulations that 
could better respond to these technological advances.108 
Justice Sotomayor joined the majority opinion, but wrote separately to 
discuss the consequences of precise location tracking in the modern age.109  
Justice Sotomayor emphasized how location tracking through GPS 
technology allowed the government to not only create “a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth 
of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations,” but also to retain this record indefinitely.110  To Justice 
Sotomayor, such extensive monitoring by the government “chills 
associational and expressive freedoms.”111  Justice Sotomayor stated that all 
of these considerations should weigh on the Court’s evaluation of the 
defendant’s asserted privacy right under Katz.112 
Justice Sotomayor used her concurrence to critique one of the most 
controversial theories in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: the third-party 
 
103  Id. at 950. 
104  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.  
105  Id. at 959–60 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
106  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964.  
107  Id. 
108  Id. at 963–64. 
109  Id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
110  Id. at 955–56. 
111  Id. at 956. 
112  Id. 
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doctrine.113  The third-party doctrine establishes that one cannot have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information that he or she has given to 
a third party voluntarily.114  In 1976, the Court in United States v. Miller 
held that the government did not violate the Fourth Amendment when it 
obtained the defendant’s financial records held at his bank without a 
warrant because the defendant had voluntarily given these records to the 
bank.115  Similarly, in 1979, the Court in Smith v. Maryland held that the 
government’s use of a pen register, a technology which records the phone 
numbers dialed on a phone, did not violate the Fourth Amendment because 
the defendant voluntarily provided the phone company with these phone 
numbers by placing the call.116  In both of these cases, the Court linked the 
third-party doctrine to the reasonable expectation of privacy test, observing 
in Smith that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”117 
In her Jones concurrence, Justice Sotomayor argued that the third-
party doctrine should be revisited, as she viewed the doctrine “ill suited to 
the digital age.”118  Justice Sotomayor observed that in today’s world, 
people disclose a great deal of information to third parties that many in 
society would still likely consider private, such as “the URLs that they visit 
and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond.”119  Justice 
Sotomayor stated that she “would not assume that all information 
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, 
for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”120 
Finally, the Court has recently recognized the essential role cell phones 
have in modern society in its 2014 decision in Riley v. California.121  
Observing that cell phones “are now such a pervasive and insistent part of 
daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an 
important feature of human anatomy,” the Court unanimously held that the 
government must obtain a warrant before searching a cell phone.122  
Although the common law had allowed police to search the items on an 
 
113  Id. at 957. 
114  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 
435, 442 (1976); see also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301–02 (1966). 
115  Miller, 425 U.S. at 442. 
116  Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. 
117  Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44. 
118  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
119  Id. 
120  Id. 
121  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014). 
122  Id. at 2484. 
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arrestee’s person for centuries, the Court found that this traditional 
approach did not strike the right balance between the government’s interests 
and arrestee’s privacy interests when applied to cell phones.123  Concurring 
in Riley, Justice Alito again invited Congress and states to pass new 
regulations on cell phone searches, asserting that legislatures may be the 
better equipped to balance the competing interests at stake.124 
C. THE ARCHAIC PROTECTIONS OF THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS 
ACT 
Along with the constitutional limitations courts have imposed on 
searches assisted by modern technology, Congress has also placed limits 
and established procedures for such searches.  In fact, Congress and the 
Court have often worked hand-in-hand to bring privacy protections to 
evolving technologies.  For example, in 1968, after the Court brought audio 
surveillance within the purview of the Fourth Amendment in Katz, 
Congress passed the Wiretap Act, which sought to regulate the government 
access to the contents of traditional phone calls.125  The Act provided for 
comprehensive and detailed regulations and procedures for wiretap orders. 
In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act, which included a subsidiary act called the Stored Communications Act 
(SCA).126  Then, in 1994, Congress updated the SCA and established the 
current standards governing law enforcement requests for electronic 
communications.127  For historic CSLI, the SCA permits the government 
access through two different court orders.  First, the government may obtain 
a warrant that meets the standards of both the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and the Fourth Amendment.128  Under this approach, a judge 
must find that there is probable cause to support the warrant. 
Second, the government may obtain a court order which requires a 
 
123  Id. 
124  Id. at 2497 (Alito, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
125  Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2012); DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., INFORMATION 
PRIVACY LAW 264–65 (2d ed. 2006).  
126  Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.); Stored Communications Act, Pub. 
L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.); 
SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 125, at 265.  
127  See In re Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose, 620 F.3d 304, 314 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(reviewing the history of the SCA); Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored 
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1208, 1219 (2004). 
128  18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A) (2016).  
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lower showing than probable cause.129  Although the court order is similar 
to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, in that a neutral 
detached judicial officer is determining the justification, the amount of 
justification distinguishes it from the traditional warrant requirement.  
Under § 2703(d) of the SCA, the government can obtain a court order for 
CSLI if it “offers specific and articulable facts showing that are reasonable 
grounds to believe that . . . the records or other information sought, are 
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”130  This 
standard is based off the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasonable suspicion 
standard, which originated in Terry v. Ohio.131  In Terry, the Court adopted 
a lesser standard than probable cause because the intrusion, a pat-down by a 
police officer, was somewhat less than an arrest132 and because at the time 
the legislation was passed location data was imprecise and there were 
substantially fewer cell phones.  In the same way, Congress at the time 
believed CSLI did not need the full protection of probable cause because 
the review of CSLI did not seriously impinge on a cell phone user’s 
privacy.133 
Section 2703(d)’s standard places a less stringent burden on the 
government both in its evidentiary showing and in its target.  Since Terry, 
courts have routinely recognized that a showing of “reasonable suspicion” 
is easier to meet than a showing of probable cause.134  Moreover, because 
the government must only show that the information is “relevant and 
material” to the investigation, it can obtain § 2703(d) orders with a far 
broader scope than a Fourth Amendment warrant, which requires 
particularized descriptions of the place to be searched and the items to be 
seized.135  These lower standards have allowed the government to seek out 
CSLI at an alarming rate.  In 2015, AT&T received 58,189 demands for 
historic CSLI, while in the second half of 2015, Verizon received 20,298 
demands for CSLI, two-thirds of which came from § 2703(d) orders.136 
 
129  Id. § 2703(a). 
130  Id. § 2703(d). 
131  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
132  Id. 
133  See In re Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose, 620 F.3d 304, 314–15 (3d Cir. 2010), 
(discussing how the legislative history of the SCA and its amendments show that the 
government sought an “intermediate [standard] that is less stringent than probable cause”). 
134  See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421 (1981). 
135  Freiwald, supra note 15, at 697.  
136 AT&T Transparency Report, AT&T, http://about.att.com/content/csr/home/
frequently-requested-info/governance/transparencyreport.html (last visited July 9, 2016); 
Verizon Transparency Report, VERIZON, http://www.verizon.com/about/portal/transparency-
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When the SCA was passed, cell phones were still very much in their 
infancy.  The FCC had permitted the first generation of cellular service 
networks only five years before.137  In 1986, there were only an estimated 
681,825 total subscriber connections in the United States serviced by 1,531 
cell sites.138  In contrast, by 2013, there were over 335 million estimated 
total subscriber connections, in turn serviced by 304,360 cell sites.139  Due 
to this explosion in cell users and cell sites, CSLI is no longer an imprecise 
means of tracking available in only a few parts of the country; CSLI has 
created a dragnet surveillance system far beyond what the legislators who 
enacted the SCA could have imagined. 
II. AN INDIVIDUAL’S PERSONAL HISTORY OR A SERVICE PROVIDER’S 
BUSINESS RECORD?: COURTS SPLIT OVER FOURTH AMENDMENT’S 
APPLICATION TO CSLI. 
The initial circuit courts to address the Fourth Amendment’s 
application to CSLI found that the government’s warrantless review of such 
information did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  In 2010, the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the government did not have to show 
probable cause to obtain a court order for CSLI.140  The Third Circuit 
distinguished CSLI from the beeper technology used in Knotts and Karo, 
finding that CSLI was less precise than beeper tracking technology and 
therefore did not raise the same level of privacy concerns.141  Then, in 2013, 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the third-party doctrine to hold 
that those who use cell phones voluntarily convey their location to their 
phone providers and therefore have no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the CSLI generated.142 
Recently, however, courts have begun to fracture over this question.  
This Part reviews the recent evolution in case law on CSLI and the Fourth 
Amendment.143  Section A discusses the courts that have found that a 
 
report/us-report/ (last visited July 9, 2016).  
137  See Cellular Communications Systems Decisions, 86 F.C.C.2d 469 (1981). 
138  See Cellular Telecomm. Indus. Ass’n, Annual Wireless Industry Survey Results—
December 1985 to December 2013 (2014), http://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/Facts-
Stats/ctia_survey_ye_2013_graphics-final.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
139  Id. 
140  In re Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose, 620 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2010). 
141  Id. at 312. 
142  In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 613–14 (5th Cir. 
2013). 
143  See infra notes 147–230 and accompanying text. 
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warrantless review of CSLI violates the Fourth Amendment.144  Section B 
discusses the courts that either have found that the Fourth Amendment does 
not apply to CSLI or have yet to firmly decide.145 
A.  COURTS THAT HAVE HELD THAT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
REQUIRES THE GOVERNMENT TO OBTAIN A WARRANT BEFORE 
REVIEWING CSLI 
In 2014, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. 
Davis (Davis I),146 became the first circuit to hold that the Fourth 
Amendment requires the government to obtain a warrant before reviewing 
CSLI.147  In Davis I, the government received a court order for CSLI on the 
defendant, and then used that CSLI to show that the defendant had made 
phone calls at the same time and location as several robberies.148  The 
Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the CSLI generated from his cell phone.149  The court compared 
the warrantless GPS tracking of a car in Jones to the tracking of a cell 
phone through CSLI.150  The court found that tracking a cell phone can 
invade a person’s privacy far more than tracking a car, for “[o]ne’s cell 
phone, unlike an automobile, can accompany its owner anywhere . . . 
convert[ing] what would otherwise be a private event into a public one.”151  
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the government’s argument that 
CSLI was too imprecise to violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.152  
To the court, even if CSLI could only reveal whether a person is near a 
location, “[t]here is a reasonable privacy interest in being near the home of 
a lover, or a dispensary of medication, or a place of worship, or a house of 
ill repute.”153 
The Eleventh Circuit also found that the third-party doctrine did not 
apply because the defendant had not voluntarily conveyed his location to 
 
144  See infra notes 147–188 and accompanying text. 
145  See infra notes 189–230 and accompanying text. 
146  Davis I, 754 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted, opinion 
vacated, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014) and on reh’g en banc in part, 785 F.3d 498 
(11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015). 
147  Id. 
148  Davis I, 754 F.3d at 1209–10, 1218. 
149  Id. at 1215. 
150  Id. at 1216. 
151  Id.  
152  Id.  
153  Id. 
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his cell phone provider.154  The court recognized that most cell phone users 
would not think that their service providers both collect and, more 
importantly, “store historical location information.”155  The court recounted 
the prosecutor’s statement to the jury in the defendant’s trial, where he said 
the defendant and his co-conspirators “probably had no idea that by 
bringing their cell phones with them to these robberies they were allowing 
[their cell service provider] and now all of you to follow their movements 
on the days and at the times of the robberies.”156 
In 2015, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
United States v. Graham (Graham I)157 held that the government’s 
warrantless collection and review of a person’s CSLI violates the Fourth 
Amendment.158  In Graham, the government received a list of the 
defendant’s CSLI from July 1, 2010 through February 6, 2011, a period of 
221 days.159  The Fourth Circuit noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has 
recognized an individual’s privacy interests in comprehensive accounts of 
her movements, in her location, and in the location of her personal property 
in private spaces.”160  Applying Karo, the court found tracking through 
CSLI likely revealed details about the defendant’s home on “several dozen 
specific occasions,” thereby invading his privacy even more than the beeper 
tracking at issue in Karo.161  Then, applying Jones, the court observed that 
the “privacy interests affected by long-term GPS monitoring . . . apply with 
equal or greater force to historical CSLI for an extended period of time.”162  
Just as the Eleventh Circuit did in Davis I, the Fourth Circuit found that cell 
phones, due to their small size and increasingly inseparable relationship 
with their users, allow for far more revealing tracking through private and 
public areas than the tracking of cars.163 
Expressing concern about the future of location tracking through 
CSLI, the Fourth Circuit sought to craft a rule that could respond to 
technological advancements in cellular networks.  The court discussed the 
 
154  Id. at 1217. 
155  Id. (quoting In re Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(emphasis in original)). 
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157  Graham I, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, 624 F. App’x 75 
(4th Cir. 2015). 
158  Id. at 349. 
159  Graham I, 796 F.3d at 341. 
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rise of small cell technologies, including microcells and femtocells, and 
“[t]he intense competition among cellular networks” to increase data 
capacity.164  Because small cells will likely increase the overall accuracy of 
CSLI, the court stated that it was obligated to “take such developments into 
account” when evaluating surveillance through CSLI.165 
The Fourth Circuit explained at length why the third-party doctrine did 
not apply to CSLI.166  The court found that cell phone users do not 
voluntarily convey CSLI to service providers for several reasons.167  First, 
the court observed that a cell phone user “is not required to actively submit 
any location-identifying information when making a call or sending a 
message.”168  Instead, the service provider “automatically generates CSLI in 
response to connections made between the cell phone and the provider’s 
network.”169  Because cell phone users do not actively choose to disclose 
their information, the court refused to find that users voluntarily disclose 
their location to their network.170  According to the court, private 
information only loses Fourth Amendment protection when it is disclosed 
consciously and willingly.171 
Second, the court focused on the important role cell phones play in 
modern society.  The court recognized that “for an increasing portion of our 
society, [cell phone use] has become essential to full cultural and economic 
participation.”172  The mere common act of using a cell phone cannot in 
turn mean that people “have volunteered to forfeit expectations of 
privacy.”173  Although the court accepted the legitimate business necessity 
service providers have in generating CSLI, the court feared that application 
of the third-party doctrine to CSLI would greatly limit the Fourth 
Amendment in the modern world: 
It turns out that the proliferation of cellular networks has left service providers with a 
continuing stream of increasingly precise information about the locations and 
movements of network users.  Prior to this development, people generally had no 
cause for concern that their movements could be tracked to this extent.  That new 
technology has happened to generate and permit retention of this information cannot 
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by itself displace our reasonable privacy expectations; nor can it justify inspection of 
this information by the government in the absence of judicially determined probable 
cause.174 
Because of these concerns, the Fourth Circuit refused to expand the third-
party doctrine and abrogate a cell phone user’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their locational history.175 
The dissent in Graham argued that CSLI should receive no Fourth 
Amendment protection because it is governed entirely by the third-party 
doctrine.176  The dissent argued that cell phone users not only convey CSLI 
to service providers, but also do so voluntarily.177  The dissent reasoned that 
although service providers produce the record of CSLI, it is the user who 
conveys the underlying data to the service provider by using the phone.178  
Moreover, the user conveys this information voluntarily because all cell 
phone users know that their phone interacts with the cellular network.179 
The dissent gave an example from everyday life: “[a]nyone who has 
stepped outside to ‘get a signal,’ or has warned a caller of a potential loss of 
service before entering an elevator, understands, on some level, that 
location matters.”180  According to the dissent, because cell phone users 
know that their “location matters,” they likewise know and accept that a 
third party has accessed and recorded their location.181  The dissent 
acknowledged the temptation of “holding that individuals always have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in large quantities of location 
information, even if they have shared that information with a phone 
company.”182  The dissent concluded, however, that “the third-party 
doctrine does not afford us that option” because under the doctrine, “the 
quantity of information an individual shares with a third party does not 
affect whether that individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”183 
Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to decide whether 
CSLI receives Fourth Amendment protection, several district courts from 
within that circuit have extended such protection.184  In 2015, the District 
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Court for the Northern District of California in In re: Application for 
Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation185 upheld a 
magistrate order denying the government access to CSLI without obtaining 
a warrant based on probable cause.186  Then, on January 7, 2016, in United 
States v. Williams,187 another judge from the District Court for the Northern 
District of California held that “defendants had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the CSLI and that probable cause was necessary to obtain [a 
warrant].”188 
B. COURTS THAT HAVE HELD THAT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOES 
NOT REQUIRE WARRANTS TO REVIEW CSLI 
After the decision in Davis I, the Eleventh Circuit agreed to rehear the 
case en banc.189  In 2015, in United States v. Davis (Davis II),190 the en banc 
court held that the government’s review of the defendant’s CSLI did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.191  First, the Eleventh Circuit found that the 
CSLI related to the defendant’s cell phone was a business record owned and 
generated by his service provider, MetroPCS, in which he could claim no 
direct interest.192  Referring to the CSLI as “cell tower records,” the court 
explained that the records “were created by MetroPCS, stored on its own 
premises, and subject to its control.”193  Therefore, the court found that the 
service provider had every right to comply with the government’s § 2703(d) 
order and produce its business record of the defendant’s location history.194 
Second, citing Miller and Smith, the court held that the defendant had 
neither a subjective nor a reasonable expectation of privacy in the CSLI.195  
Because “cell users know that they must transmit signals to cell towers 
within range,” the court found that they know they are providing location 
 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016); In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal 
Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2015), appeal dismissed (Feb. 5, 
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189  United States v. Davis (Davis II), 785 F.3d 498, 511 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 479 (2015). 
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information to their service provider, and therefore lack a subjective 
expectation of privacy.196  Moreover, the court found that people cannot 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI because Smith specifically 
held that people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the non-
content information generated to facilitate phone conversations.197  
Although the Eleventh Circuit recognized that “the landscape of technology 
has changed” since Miller and Smith, it was unwilling to depart from such 
precedent simply because of these technological advances.198 
After resolving the defendant’s challenge through the third-party 
doctrine, the Eleventh Circuit turned to Jones.199  The Eleventh Circuit 
feeling the need to distinguish Jones noted the two essential differences 
between the defendant’s case and Jones: first, in the case before the court, it 
was a private service provider, not the government, that collected the 
location information, and second, there was no “physical intrusion on 
private property” to gather this location information.200  The court went on, 
however, to explain “even setting aside the controlling third-party 
doctrine,” CSLI “is materially distinguishable from the precise, real-time 
GPS tracking in Jones,” because CSLI cannot “identify the cell phone 
user’s location with pinpoint precision.”201  Because it reveals only the 
person’s general location, the court asserted that CSLI does not pose a 
serious a threat to privacy.202  Obviously there are greater privacy 
expectations when precise information as opposed to general information of 
one’s location is implicated. 
The dissent, however, noted that the government obtained sixty-seven 
days’ worth of CSLI, which gave the government access to information 
related to “5,803 phone calls” or “11,606 data points” on the defendant’s 
location.203  Therefore, the dissent resisted applying the third-party doctrine 
to the defendant’s claim because allowing the government to obtain such a 
massive amount of location information without a warrant would greatly 
diminish the Fourth Amendment’s protections in the modern world.204  
 
196  Id.   
197  Id. 
198  Id. at 512. 
199  Id. at 513. 
200  Davis II, 785 F.3d at 513.  
201  Id. at 515.   
202  Id. 
203  Id. at 533 (Martin, J. dissenting). 
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Moving past the third-party doctrine, the dissent argued that individuals 
likely have a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI.205  Observing that 
“the subjective inquiry is easy,” the dissent argued that “people do not 
expect the government to track them simply as a consequence of owning 
and using what amounts to a basic necessity of twenty-first century life—
the cell phone.”206 
The dissent made note of the rise of small cell technologies to rebut the 
majority’s narrow view of the precision of CSLI.207  Specifically, the 
dissent noted that small cells now make it impossible to know how precise 
CSLI is going to be in a certain case: 
As a person walks around town, particularly a dense, urban environment, her cell 
phone continuously and without notice to her connects with towers, antennas, 
microcells, and femtocells that reveal her location information with differing levels of 
precision—to the nearest mile, or the nearest block, or the nearest foot.  And since a 
text or phone call could come in at any second—without any affirmative act by a cell 
phone user—a user has no control of the extent of location information she reveals.208 
According to the dissent, such an unlimited power to gather precise location 
information about an individual must be fettered by the Fourth Amendment, 
as an individual should only have such a detailed history of his or her 
travels reviewed by the government after a judge has found that probable 
cause justifies this invasion of privacy.209 
In 2016, in United States v. Graham (Graham II),210 the en banc court 
for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the earlier panel decision 
and held that the government’s review of defendant’s CSLI did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.211  The court found that the defendant had 
voluntarily turned over his location information to his service provider and 
therefore, under the third-party doctrine, lost any reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his CSLI.212  Although the court applied the third-party doctrine, 
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it did recognize the uncertain state of law around CSLI, noting how “[t]he 
Supreme Court may in the future limit, or even eliminate, the third-party 
doctrine.  Congress may act to require a warrant for CSLI.  But without a 
change in controlling law, we cannot conclude that the Government 
violated the Fourth Amendment in this case.”213 
The dissent took issue with the majority’s conclusion that the 
defendant had “voluntarily conveyed” his location information at all.214  “A 
customer buys a cell phone.  She turns it on and puts it in her pocket.  With 
those acts, says the majority, she has ‘voluntarily conveyed’ an unbounded 
set of personal location data to her service provider, all of which is 
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.”215  The dissent argued that under 
the third-party doctrine, a defendant conveys information voluntarily only 
when he has knowledge of the information and takes an affirmative action 
to transmit that information to a third party.216  Applying this definition, the 
dissent explained how “there is no reason to think that a cell phone user is 
aware of his CSLI, or that he is conveying it.”217  Most cell phone users are 
completely unaware of the fact that their service provider logs their location 
not only when they make calls, but also when, as the dissent emphasized, 
they passively receive calls.218  Because CSLI is generated without the 
user’s knowledge and often without any accompanying affirmative act, the 
dissent would have found no voluntary conveyance of information and 
therefore not applied the third-party doctrine.219 
In 2016, in United States v. Carpenter,220 the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals also held that the Fourth Amendment did not require the 
government to obtain a warrant before reviewing CSLI.221  The court found 
that CSLI was not private content, but was instead simply routing 
information similar to “mailing addresses, phone numbers, and IP 
addresses” that service providers use to facilitate phone calls.222  Applying 
the third-party doctrine, the court relied heavily on Smith and found no 
material difference from the phone numbers collected in Smith and the 
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CSLI at issue.223 
The court stated that CSLI, or at least the CSLI generated given the 
facts of the case before it, is far less precise than the GPS tracking from 
Jones.224  The court acknowledged an amicus brief filed by the American 
Civil Liberties Union, which extensively discussed the rise of small cells in 
traditional cellular networks.225  However, the court ignored any concerns 
regarding small cells, stating that “our task is to decide this case, not 
hypothetical ones; and in this case there are no femtocells to be found.”226 
The concurrence in Carpenter argued that the majority gave short 
shrift to the defendant’s Fourth Amendment concerns.227  The concurrence 
argued that by describing CSLI as routing information, the majority failed 
to capture the privacy interests at stake in CSLI, for mailing addresses, 
phone numbers, and IP addresses “do not necessarily reflect personal 
location” in the way CSLI does.228  The concurrence would have compared 
CSLI to location information like the GPS data in Jones.229  Although the 
concurrence accepted that the CSLI at issue in this case was less accurate 
than the GPS data in Jones, it recognized that it may be time “to develop a 
new test to determine when a warrant may be necessary under these or 
comparable circumstances.”230 
III. A RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM DRAGNET SURVEILLANCE: THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT PROTECTS A PERSON’S CSLI 
This Part argues that the government must obtain a warrant before 
reviewing CSLI.231  Section A argues that people have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the location information their cell phones 
generate.232  Section B explains why the third-party doctrine should not 
preclude courts from giving CSLI Fourth Amendment protection.233  
Section C asserts that Congress should reform the SCA to mandate probable 
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cause warrants for CSLI.234 
A. PEOPLE POSSESS A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN 
THEIR LOCATION HISTORY 
The U.S.  Supreme Court should hold that people have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their location data generated through CSLI, 
particularly as this location data grows increasingly precise.  In finding that 
cell phone users do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI, 
the Eleventh Circuit in Davis II asserted that CSLI “does not identify the 
cell phone user’s location with pinpoint precision.”235  Although this may 
have been true in a traditional cellular service network composed only of 
large base stations, in a world of femtocells, picocells, SmartPoles, and 
other small cell technologies, this is no longer the case.236  The more precise 
the information, the greater the chance of pinpointing a user’s location.  
Cell phone users, particularly those that live in dense urban environments, 
may now generate CSLI that reveals their location to within a matter of 
feet—not a matter of miles like under the traditional system.237 
A future where the nearest base station is on the telephone pole outside 
one’s home or inside the hallway of an apartment building is already here in 
some American cities and will increasingly become the norm based on the 
projected growth of small cell technologies.238  Courts must consider CSLI 
as amplified by small cells in order to truly appreciate the threat to privacy 
it poses. 
Under the distinction the Court formulated in Knotts and Karo, the 
government’s review of CSLI will often violate a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy by revealing information from within a person’s 
home that the government “could not have otherwise obtained without a 
warrant.”239  Once base stations are immediately outside or even inside a 
person’s home, location information from these stations will perform the 
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same function that the concealed beeper did in Karo.240  CSLI will be able 
to tell the government “that a particular article,” in this case a person’s cell 
phone, “is actually located at a particular time in the private residence and is 
in the possession of the person or persons whose residence is being 
watched.”241  This is beyond the mere augmentation of regular police 
surveillance permitted in Knotts; this is the “dragnet-type law enforcement 
practices” of “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this 
country . . . without judicial knowledge or supervision” of which the Knotts 
Court warned.242  Warrantless collection of CSLI would allow the 
government to track people after they have retreated into their homes, the 
area granted the greatest privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment. 
Looking beyond CSLI collected from within a person’s home, the 
government’s review of CSLI also violates one’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy under the analysis endorsed by the five Justices in Jones.243  
Although Justice Alito could not draw a precise line as to when location 
monitoring through advanced technology violated a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, he accepted that at a minimum, “longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of 
privacy” because people do not reasonably expect their whereabouts to be 
monitored for an extended period of time by law enforcement.244  The GPS 
monitoring in Jones took place over twenty-eight days.245  The CSLI 
monitoring in Davis II took place over sixty-seven days, generating 11,606 
data points tracing the defendant’s location,246 while the CSLI monitoring in 
Graham took place over 221 days.247  It would be shocking if the CSLI 
monitoring at issue in both of these cases failed to meet the standard of 
long-term location monitoring that violates a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
Moreover, even shorter-term monitoring may violate the theory of 
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reasonable expectation of privacy advanced by Justice Sotomayor in 
Jones.248  According to Justice Sotomayor, all location tracking through 
advanced technology granted the government the power to amass “a 
precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects 
a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”249  Even a relatively short period of location 
monitoring through CSLI could reveal a wide array of deeply personal and 
private information.  The continuous and precise monitoring presents 
serious issues as to whether we as a free society should accept this intrusion 
by the government.  Likewise, Justice Alito in his Jones concurrence 
struggled to draw an exact line between long- and short-term monitoring, a 
problem that has plagued the appellate courts confronting CSLI tracking as 
well.250 Therefore, in order to craft a rule that gives the government proper 
notice as to what actions will and will not violate the Fourth Amendment, 
the Court should hold that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in all CSLI, regardless of the amount collected by the government. 
By focusing on CSLI generated from traditional cellular networks, the 
Eleventh Circuit in Davis II drastically underestimated the precision of 
CSLI.251 A court that confronts tracking through CSLI must take into 
account the rise of small cell technologies.  And when such a court 
considers a future where every street lamp could be a cell tower and every 
apartment, office, or public park comes equipped with its own dedicated 
team of femtocells and picocells, it must find that, despite these 
technological encroachments, people retain a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their movements through the day. 
B. THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE DOES NOT PRECLUDE PROTECTION 
Having established that people have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their CSLI, the third-party doctrine does not apply to CSLI 
because cell phone users do not “voluntarily convey” their location to their 
service providers.  In both Miller and Smith, the defendants made an active 
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choice to give certain information to a third party.252  By writing checks and 
making deposits, the defendant in Miller created the financial documents at 
issue and voluntarily conveyed them to the bank.253  By manually punching 
numbers into his telephone, the defendant in Smith actively provided the 
phone company with the exact same information later used against him in a 
criminal trial.254 
Unlike Miller and Smith, service providers passively collect CSLI each 
time a user’s phone connects to a base station.  As the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals recognized in Graham I, a cell phone user “is not required to 
actively submit any location-identifying information when making a call or 
sending a message.”255  Rather, the information at issue is information that 
the service provider “automatically generates . . . in response to connections 
made between the cell phone and the provider’s network.”256  Although 
CSLI is generated when cell phone users make the active choice to place a 
phone call, CSLI is also generated when users make no active choice at all, 
such as when they receive calls or text messages or, for smartphone users, 
when applications connect to the network for updates.257  It is difficult to 
see how users voluntarily convey anything when they receive unsolicited 
calls from telemarketers or when applications built into their phone silently 
update in the background. 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Davis II incorrectly equated 
a cell phone user’s vague awareness of how a cell phone functions with the 
active choices the defendants made in Smith and Miller.258  In Smith, the 
Court could draw a clear line from the defendant’s choice to give telephone 
numbers to the phone company and the government’s later use of those 
phone numbers as evidence.259  With the conveyance of CSLI, the line is far 
less clear, as no service provider requires its users to manually enter their 
location each time they place a call.260 
Even if the U.S. Supreme Court were to find that cell phone users 
voluntarily convey their location information to their service providers, the 
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Court should take up the questions Justice Sotomayor raised in Jones and 
reexamine the continued viability of the third-party doctrine in the digital 
age.261  The observations made by the Eleventh Circuit in Davis II and the 
dissent in Graham I are not without merit.  As the dissent in Graham I 
observed, on some level, cell phone users who run outside when they 
receive an important call do understand that in order to get a better signal 
“location matters.”262  However, if the third-party doctrine allows the 
government unfettered access to location data on all Americans who—at 
even the most archaic level—understand that their information is accessible 
to any company that provides a digital service, then as the dissent in Davis 
II observed, the Fourth Amendment offers shrinking protection in the 
increasing online world.263  Justice Sotomayor explained in her concurrence 
in Jones that in order to participate in modern society, people must disclose 
all sorts of private information, whether through accessing emails, shopping 
online, or carrying a cell phone.264  Further, in Riley v. California, the Court 
unanimously recognized the essential role cell phones have in the modern 
world.265 
The Court confronted a similar doctrinal challenge in Katz.  In Katz, 
rigid application of the Fourth Amendment’s trespass theory—the only 
theory that existed at the time for showing a constitutional violation—
would have granted the government the power to listen in on the 
defendant’s private conversation.266  The Court refused to allow old 
doctrines to interfere with the core privacy protections of the Fourth 
Amendment.267  Instead, the Court formulated a new approach that properly 
considered “the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in 
private communication.”268  Similarly, in Riley v. California, the Court 
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adopted a new doctrine to deal with searches incident to an arrest when the 
search involves a cell phone.269 
Today’s Supreme Court faces an equally important choice.  If the 
Court finds that the third-party doctrine stands in the way of protecting 
CSLI from warrantless searches, then the Court must refashion its old 
doctrine.  Whether the Court finds that passive collection is different than 
active disclosures, or whether it simply decides that the doctrine as a whole 
must be discarded in the digital realm, it must not stand by and allow the 
third-party doctrine to swallow the Fourth Amendment. 
C. BRINGING THE SCA INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 
Congress should also acknowledge the radical technological changes 
that have occurred over the past thirty years and remove § 2703(d) orders 
from the SCA.  When the SCA was enacted, Congress could not possibly 
have envisioned a future where cell phones were omnipresent and 
inseparable from their users.  Requiring only “specific and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that . . . the records or 
other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation” for a court order for CSLI270 may have made sense when the 
United States had only 1,531 cell sites, as it did in 1994.271  It does not 
make sense today in a country that contains millions of cell sites, through 
which the government can gain access to a person’s movements within ten-
foot increments through the use of small cells. 
In order to best protect location privacy in the modern world, Congress 
must require prosecutors to go before a judge and make a showing of 
probable cause before obtaining access to this trove of location information.  
Because small cell technologies are evolving so rapidly, Congress may be 
better suited than the courts to respond to these developments.  Congress 
should follow Justice Alito’s instruction from his concurrences in Jones and 
Riley and craft comprehensive legislation that balances the competing 
interests at stake in these cases.272 
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In doing so, Congress must follow the Fourth Amendment 
requirements of probable cause and particularity and demand that orders for 
CSLI only issue upon probable cause and are only directed at particularized 
targets whose accounts contain evidence of the crime under investigation.  
The lower § 2703(d) standard follows from the reasonable suspicion 
standard the U.S.  Supreme Court formulated in Terry v. Ohio.273  The 
Court in Terry, however, permitted this lower justification only because the 
intrusion at issue—a pat-down—was minor; an officer “for the protection 
of himself and others” was permitted only “to conduct a carefully limited 
search of the outer clothing” of the target.274  When the government reviews 
CSLI, it gains access to the precise details of a person’s movements across 
a potentially vast period of time.  This is far beyond the “carefully limited 
search” the Terry standard authorized.  Because the government’s review of 
CSLI represents a large intrusion into the precise details of a person’s 
movements, the government must in turn justify its search under a more 
stringent standard. 
Congress must reform both components of the § 2703(d) standard.  
First, it must require a showing of probable cause, not reasonable suspicion, 
to obtain access to CSLI.  Reasonable suspicion demands too little from the 
government, as courts have routinely recognized the low showing needed to 
meet the reasonable suspicion burden.  Under a probable cause standard, the 
government will have to present “reasonably trustworthy information . . . to 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or 
is being committed.”275  A probable cause standard will thereby ensure that 
the government gathers CSLI only when it suspects a person of committing 
a crime, rather than merely having information “relevant and material” to an 
investigation.276  In this way, a probable cause standard gives proper 
protection to the sensitive information of the general public, while still 
 
we are to assess and respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that almost 
certainly will take place in the future.”); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945, 964 (2012) 
(“A legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed 
lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”). 
273  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
274  Id. 
275  Brinegar v. United States, 388 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1924)). 
276  See Steven M. Harkins, Note, CSLI Disclosure: Why Probable Cause Is Necessary to 
Protect What’s Left of the Fourth Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1875, 1902–03 
(2011) (“Compared to probable cause, disclosure under the relevant and material standard is 
both lower in the quantum of evidence required and broader in the individuals it can 
potentially target, particularly third parties.”). 
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allowing the government to target suspected criminals. 
Second, Congress—cognizant of the Fourth Amendment’s 
particularity requirement—should allow orders for CSLI to issue only when 
the government has shown that the order will reveal evidence of a crime.  
By allowing the government to access CSLI if it is “relevant and material” 
to its investigation, § 2703(d) allows the government access to the CSLI of 
too many innocent people who may have only a tangential connection to a 
criminal investigation.  The Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent 
legislatures from issuing general warrants that would grant government 
agents the power to search and seize whatever and whomever they so 
choose.277  In order to ensure that application for such orders for CSLI do 
not authorize dragnet surveillance of an unknown number of people, 
Congress must demand that the government explain how the CSLI sought 
will reveal evidence of a crime.278 
CONCLUSION 
From femtocells in our homes to picocells on our streetlamps, small 
cell technologies are spreading rapidly across the United States.  Although 
small cells will provide many benefits to consumers, they have the chance 
to seriously erode privacy.  The Stored Communications Act allows the 
government to obtain historical cell site location information without a 
Fourth Amendment warrant.  Small cells will make CSLI increasingly 
precise, allowing the government to chart a person’s movements down to a 
matter of feet.  When deciding whether CSLI receives Fourth Amendment 
protection, courts must consider the cellular network of the near future, 
where most towers are no longer massive antennas, but are instead no larger 
than a breadbox.  Therefore, courts should hold that the Fourth Amendment 
requires the government to obtain a particularized warrant supported by 
probable cause before it can review CSLI.  Moreover, Congress should 
recognize the increased privacy interests people have in CSLI and reform 
the SCA to require a higher showing for court orders for CSLI.  At its core, 
the Fourth Amendment must prevent the government from tracking its 
citizens from morning to night, through commute, work, church, and home, 
for days on end, without first obtaining a particularized warrant supported 
by probable cause.  The rise of small cells cannot deprive the people of this 
fundamental guarantee. 
 
277 Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176 (“To allow less [than probable cause] would be to leave 
law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.”).  
278  Freiwald, supra note 15, at 696–98. 
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“Only time will tell whether our society will prove capable of 
preserving age-old privacy protections in this increasingly networked 
era.”279 
 
 
279  Graham III, No. 12-4659, 2016 WL 3068018 at *1, *23 (4th Cir. May 31, 2016) 
(Wynn, J., dissenting).  
